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Divinity and Maximal Greatness, Daniel J. Hill. Routledge, 2005. Pp. 255.
£65.00
BRIAN LEFTOW, Oriel College, Oxford University
This book analyzes the main divine essential attributes. Inevitably, some
get more attention than others: following a chapter's introduction to per
fect being theology, we get ninety-eight pages on God's knowledge and
sixty-seven on omnipotence, then goodness, eternity, immutability, om
nipresence and necessity whiz by in a total of fifty-four. The book repays
careful study. As reviewers typically do, I will now carp, but my criticisms
should not suggest that this is less than a book well worth reading. Regret
tably, I can take up only two topics in the space allotted.

Perfect Being Theology
Hill defines a perfect being as one maximal with respect to greatness simpliciter (p. 8), a concept whose content he believes we understand, or at
any rate a concept we possess:
Some philosophers claim that they cannot make sense of the idea of
greatness simpliciter. This claim seems to me . . . undercut by the fact
that almost everybody would save a human rather than an inani
mate object from a burning house. This fact seems to me to reflect the
value that we . . . place on human life. (p. 23)
Perhaps. There are other explanations, e.g., that others might criticize fail
ure to save the human, that we feel sympathy for humans, not dishes, that
we have obligations to humans but not to dishes, that greater good will
likely flow from saving the human, that the virtuous are kind and one
cannot be kind to a dish, or that the virtuous care about suffering, and of
the two only humans suffer. The moral claims' explanations do not obvi
ously rest on claims about the relative greatness-simpliciter of humans and
dishes, either. Hill tells us that
The fear that many people have of dying or losing consciousness is . . .
evidence that people think it is greater to be living and conscious than
to be non-living or non-conscious. (p. 16)
It is certainly evidence that they prefer it. But their preference might have
more to do with thinking that for most of us most of the time, life and con
sciousness are more fun, or perhaps considering the consequences their
loss of life and consciousness would have to people and causes they love.
It does not clearly have anything to do with greatness simpliciter, a concept
which (pace Hill) most people seem to operate without, and find a bit puz
zling when they meet. Questionable too is Hill's suggestion that
It is greater to be a particular than a universal. (But if) particulars
and universals are incomparable as regards greatness . . . One could
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(restrict) the domain of quantification and say that every divine be
ing is a maximally great particular. (p. 16)
If they are incomparable, it is not clear why we should be sure that a di
vine being must come out particular. It is not germane that "most of those
we intuitively think of as theists . . . accept that every divine being is . . .
a person" (p. 17). For this is not a perfect-being consideration, and Hill
claims to be doing pure perfect being theology. If they are comparable,
though, we must ask why we should think being particular great-making.
On Hill's account an attribute F is great-making
if and only if an object, a, that has F is greater than every object, b,
like a in all particulars save that b lacks F and any properties whose
possession is implied by the possession of F, (p. 9)
and also, presumably, properties which imply being F. We might wonder
whether greatness is so tightly ordered: perhaps some properties make
whatever has them either greater than or incommensurable with things
lacking them. And it isn't clear whether only actual or also merely possible
objects count for the comparison. But I now argue that this doesn't matter,
because the definition is unsatisfiable. To begin, if disjunctive properties
count, the definition is unsatisfiable: necessarily, for every b and F, being F
implies being F or being b, and so it is not possible for any a that there be
a b which lacks not only some F but every property possessing F implies
possessing.1 If identity- and non-identity properties count, the definition is
unsatisfiable again. Consider a, which has F, and b, which does not. B has
the property of non-identity with a. A does not. Non-identity with a does
not imply being F, and if being F implied non-identity with a, a would not
have F. B, then, is not like a in all particulars save for lacking F and any
properties implying or implied by having F; clearly something similar will
work for the property of identity with a. Having F implies having some
property; nothing could lack this property. In fact, many properties are
"transcendental," i.e. having them is implied by having any property at
all: not just having some property but also being a being, self-identical,
colored if green, etc. So we must alter the definition to:
if and only if . . . b lacks F and any non-disjunctive non-identity
involving non-transcendental properties (henceforth "appropriate
properties") whose possession is implied by or implies being F.
But even this is unsatisfiable. Consider a property F only particulars can
have. In accord with the definition, we need to compare an F object with
objects which inter alia lack all appropriate properties that follow from be
ing F. Among these are being a particular. If we subtract being particular
from a particular, to have a possible item left over we must also subtract
every property which entails being particular. This includes all properties
only particulars can have, including for each particular a the property of
being identical with a. This leaves no possible particular object at all to
compare with F-particulars for greatness. Only universals are left. But no
universal is like any particular in all respects save for lacking particularity
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and any appropriate properties entailing or entailed by particularity. I have
the property of not being a universal. Being a universal neither entails nor
follows from being particular. But any universal is a universal. Every pos
sible item is either particular or universal, and the same sort of problem
will arise when we assess universals for greatness. Hill's definition, then, is
simply unsatisfiable.
Thus we must ask whether being F is great-making if no objects meet the
condition on b. If there are no such objects, there are none at least as great
as an F. So it might seem that F should come out great-making. But then
if only actual objects count for greatness comparisons, then if there were
one object, all its attributes would be great-making. If merely possible ob
jects also count, then if there were just one of those, all its attributes would
be great-making—which sounds like it should be false if (as Hill believes)
not all counterpossibles are true. Further, if being F is great-making if no
objects meet the condition on b, then having the property of having a prop
erty for which no (actual? possible?) objects meet the condition on b entails
having a great-making property. But any property that entails a great-mak
ing property is ipso facto at least derivatively great-making. So the property
of having a property for which nothing meets the condition on b comes out
great-making. That's not intuitive. Surely it doesn't make a thing greater
that there aren't other objects of a particular description. Finally, if I'm right
that on Hill's definition no object can meet the condition on b for any F,
then if being F is great-making if no objects meet the condition on b, on
Hill's definition every property comes out great-making, including being
as evil as Satan and being as ugly as sin. So let's take it that if for some F
there are no b-objects, the comparison can't be made, and so F fails to be
great-making. On Hill's account, then, no properties are great-making.
Hill seeks to fill out the concept of a divine being purely by way of judg
ments about greatness. It's possible to be a perfect being theologian with
out trying to do this, or believing in a property of greatness simpliciter. We
have better intuitions about what makes for a better case of person than
about what makes for a better case of being . So a Christian can take it from
Scripture that God is live, conscious, personal etc., and make qua perfect
being theologian well-grounded judgments about what makes one person
a better person than another. A perfect being theologian can just use per
fect-being reasoning to fill out a Scriptural concept of God in more detail.
Talk of God as a perfect being then becomes a shorthand for talk of God
as being perfect in all relevant respects, rather than a claim that God has
to the maximal degree a property of greatness simpliciter. This approach
strikes me as more hopeful than Hill's.

Maximal Power
Hill's account of omnipotence is full of good sense and interesting twists.
Still, there are things to pick at. Hill offers as an analysis of power appli
cable to the powers of an omnipotent being that
X has the power to perform an action, A, if and only if, if X had
the opportunity, know-how and the overriding desire to perform A,
then x would perform A. (p. 127)
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But it seems possible that someone actually lack the power to do A, but
be such that were he/she to acquire the opportunity, know-how and the
overriding desire to perform A, he/she would also acquire the power and
so succeed. Still, this analysis plays no real role in Hill's discussion. A
more substantive point concerns omnipotence and time.
Assuming that it is metaphysically impossible to bring about the past,
Hill asserts that being omnipotent does not require having the power to
bring it about that some event has happened (p. 166). Now Hill holds that
if one conjunct of a state of affairs obtains, whoever actualizes the other
actualizes the whole conjunctive state of affairs (p. 81). To me this is any
thing but obvious; if Lincoln dies and later I fry an egg, surely it is Booth
and I, not I alone, who bring it about that Lincoln is dead and an egg is
fried. But if this principle about conjunctions is true, then absent some ac
count of why temporal order should matter here (Hill provides none), it is
hard to see why it would not also be true that:
1.

if x brings it about that S, and then it comes about that S*, then x has
brought it about that S and S*.

Without an account of why temporal order should matter, if (1) is
false, so presumably is Hill's principle. But if (1) is true, we all bring
it about that events have happened: for we all cause events and then
have time pass.
Hill defines maximal power in terms of direct potence classes (DPCs),
classes of states of affairs an agent can bring about directly: as one does
some actions by doing others, but the most basic actions one simply does,
so one brings about some states of affairs by bringing about others, but the
most basic ones one just directly brings about (p. 166). To get a grip on the
notion, consider examples: one can't bring about conjunctive states of af
fairs directly, for one brings about conjunctions by bringing about at least
one conjunct (p. 168). So too for disjunctions (p. 168). If states of affairs do
not include a time of actualization in their makeup, one can only bring
about a raindrop's falling on Jan. 1 by bringing about a raindrop's falling, and
so dated states of affairs are not brought about directly (p. 172). Now while
directly bringing about is an unproblematic notion, one use to which Hill
puts it is troubling. Hill individuates powers by what they can directly
bring about (p. 169). So on his terms, the only genuine powers are powers
to directly bring about. What about powers to move things through space?
Plausibly I move an object a foot by moving it first one inch, then another,
etc. If that's right, then for Hill, there is no spatial interval small enough
for anyone to directly bring it about that something moves through that
interval. If so, the power to move objects through space is not a genuine
power at all, and I do not have genuine powers to perform any of the
body-movements that are usually taken as paradigm basic actions, e.g.,
raising my arm. I can say multi-syllabic words only by saying syllables,
syllables only by making consonant- and vowel-sounds, and I can make
those sounds only by moving my lips, tongue etc.; so even if we suppose
that I have a genuine power to move things through space, I won't have
one to speak. But if these are not genuine powers, I lose my grip on what
it is for power to be genuine.
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Hill also insists that no-one can directly bring about good or evil states
of affairs, as none are basic (pp. 171-72). I'm not so sure. I would blas
pheme were I sincerely to assert that:
J. Jesus was a liar.
Suppose that I do so mentally, without uttering a sound. If a mental as
serting consists of mentally tokening words or syllables, there are more
basic states of affairs I bring about such that by doing so, I bring it about
that Leftow sincerely asserts (J). But this is only contingent. There could
have been a single (say) consonant-sound mental tokening which asserted
(J), and so let's suppose that there is. (If that example seems questionable,
we can abstract a bit further: there could have been some basic state of
affairs by bringing which about I sincerely assert (J).) One might then try
Leftow tokens (J) assertively and Leftow tokens (J) sincerely . But it's not clear
that asserting really analyzes as tokening assertively: the "assertively" in
the analysans suggests that something fishy is going on. (Compare "ana
lyzing" redness as being reddish-colored.) Tokening with intent to assert
either varies this only verbally or amounts to tokening (J) and intending
to assert (J). The latter, though, does not entail asserting, for it does not
entail that the token I token is one I intend to assert: I might just intend to
assert (J) sooner or later, or to intend to assert (J), but not in the thought I
in fact have. One might next try something on the lines of something like
Leftow asserts (J) and his asserting is sincere. But this arguably really amounts
to something like Leftow brings it about that: (x)(x is an asserting of (J) and x
is sincere and x=s), where s names the event in question. This isn't made
true by my bringing about something more basic; it is not conjunctive. The
logical form of action-sentences is of course tricky terrain; my point is that
it is not at all clear that the right analysis of my sincerely asserting (J) is go
ing to give Hill what he needs. Still, even if it does, there might be states of
affairs I can't directly actualize (at least in certain circumstances) without
thereby doing evil. If I have done whatever else is necessary sincerely to
assert (J), I can't bring about the last basic state of affairs involved without
thereby doing evil. Again, if by mentally tokening the right single syllable,
I do something else—assert a proposition—my (J)-case was a case of this.
Hill's definition of maximal power is that
For every being x, x is maximally powerful if and only if for every
metaphysically possible being y, y's direct potence class does not
strictly include x's. (p. 170)
Now pace Lewis, merely possible beings don't have DPCs. Possibilia have
no powers, and if Hill's account of having power allots them some, so much
the worse for it. Still, this is easily fixed: we can talk about the DPCs possibilia would have were they actual. Given that there are states of affairs that
can't be brought about directly without thereby doing evil, consider two
DPCs: God's (let's say) includes all and only states of affairs He can directly
bring about without thereby doing evil. Schmod can actualize some but not
all of these—thus Schmod's DPC does not strictly include God's—but also
some he cannot directly bring about without thereby doing evil, e.g., making
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a decision whose propositional object is that he shall mentally blaspheme.
There are more of these in Schmod's DPC than there are possibly morally
acceptable ones missing from it. So God is maximally powerful even though
there is an intuitive sense in which Schmod can directly bring about more.
Or we can suppose that Zod's DPC contains a higher-order infinity of states
of affairs than God's but not all that God's does; then again, God is maxi
mally powerful even though it is strictly true that Zod can do more. Thus on
Hill's account, it is conceivable that someone be maximally powerful though
someone else can directly bring about more. But on a proper conceptual
analysis of maximal power, this should not be conceivable. Moreover, this
could be not just conceivable but possible for all Hill's definition tells us, for
it does not ascribe any particular range to maximal power.
Again, questions arise about parts and wholes. Does God create wholes
by creating their parts, or vice-versa, or neither? If neither, God has to make
two creative volitions, one to make the chair, one to make all of its parts.
That seems a needless duplication. One might think not: the chair and the
parts are distinct objects, each able to exist without the rest, so (one might
think) it should take distinct volitions to make them all. But God can con
ceive of the chair as including some determinate set of parts, and if He has
this conception, He can will "let there be that," and get both into being in a
single volition. One might think that this is another sort of "neither" case,
since "let there be that" does not seem to create wholes by creating parts or
vice-versa. But not necessarily: if the whole exists because the parts exist and
are appropriately arranged, then in this case God in a single volition creates
the whole by creating the parts. This gets rid of the "two volition" conse
quence, but only by removing "neither" as an option for a different reason.
If "neither" remains problematic, we might consider "both": perhaps
God does it one way in some cases and another way in others. Aristotle, for
instance, held that artifacts exist because their parts do (and are rightly ar
ranged), but functionally-defined parts of substances exist because the whole
substance does. But this option would complicate the argument below with
out affecting its substance, so we can ignore it and simply ask, does God cre
ate wholes by creating their parts, or vice-versa? If the first, it is on Hill's terms
part of what makes Him maximally powerful that He can create quarks and
electrons, but not part of what makes Him maximally powerful to be able
to create tables and chairs. If the second, it is part of what makes Him maxi
mally powerful to be able to make universes, but not part of what makes
Him maximally powerful that He can make stars, quarks and electrons—in
fact, if the second, only universes figure in God's DPC, and His power with
respect to these is enough to render Him maximally powerful. Either way,
we have the oddity that a being can have more powers than those that suffice
to make it maximally powerful—which sounds like a more than maximal set
of powers. Surely if a thing manages to be maximally powerful, it takes all its
powers to get it there; every power it has helps constitute its maximal overall
power. For Hill, again, the only genuine powers are powers to directly bring
about. Thus on Hill's terms, if (say) God makes wholes by making parts,
either there are genuine productive powers in addition to making quarks,
electrons and other possible simples, but God has none of them, or there are
no such powers. If the latter is true, we have no genuine productive powers.
If the former, we have genuine powers to produce macroscopic objects, but
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oddly, God does not (and again we wonder what "genuine" means here,
since God genuinely manages to produce them). So it seems that Hill has
a problem no matter which way he goes. Some of these problems could be
blunted were Hill able to show that necessarily, every maximally powerful
being is also omnipotent, since he defines omnipotence roughly this way: x
is omnipotent just if, for every state of affairs S, if S is in some possible being's
DPC, S is in x's DPC (p. 169). Hill does not argue for this, and the problems
just outlined are reasons to think that it can't be shown.
Reviewers should praise and not just bury; I'll say again that this is a
book worth reading. Routledge should be encouraged to come out with a
paper edition: the book's price is an outrage.2
NOTES
1. My thanks to Joseph Jedwab here.
2. My thanks to the author, correspondence with whom considerably im
proved this review.

Rethinking the Ontological Argument: A Neoclassical Theistic Response, by
Daniel A. Dombrowski. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp.
vii and 172. Cloth $70.00.
ANDREW NAM, Baylor University
As its title suggests, the book purports to defend Anselm's famous argu
ment from a distinctly process philosophical perspective, namely that of
Charles Hartshorne. The book's six chapters can be further reduced to four
categories: (a) a historical survey of the argument (Plato's anticipation,
Anselm's initial articulation, various versions and interpretations after
Anselm, and Hume's critique), (b) a critique of the contemporary oppo
nents in the non-analytic tradition (Richard Rorty and Mark Taylor), (c)
a critique of the most prominent contemporary opponent in the analytic
tradition (Graham Oppy), and finally (d) a criticism of classical theism.
This book is, as one can see, more than just a philosophical examination
of the validity and soundness of the argument itself. So, those readers
who are solely interested in seeing an 'analytic' discussion of the argu
ment will likely be disappointed, as is evident in William Lane Craig's
searing review in Philosophia Christi (9:1). While sharing some of the dis
appointment, which will be shown below, I wish to pay closer attention
to Dombrowski's central claim throughout his work, that the ontological
argument's cogency and merit—both philosophical and religious-logically requires the neoclassical view of God.
Let us first examine Dombrowski's formulation of the argument and
its defense against Oppy's critique, and secondly his criticism of classical
theism. He sees two distinct versions of the argument in Anselm's Proslogion, one in chapter 2 and the other in chapter 3, favoring the latter as the
stronger of the two. Although he questions its truth later, Dombrowski
grants, for the sake of argument, that Kant's objection, 'Existence is not a

